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His most important refinement of the theory, derived from his recognition of bank deposits as means of exchange, was to treat their out of equilibrium recursive interaction with inflation as integral to it. This treatment underlay both his 1920s work on the business cycle as a "dance of the dollar" and his advocacy of subjecting monetary policy to a legislated price stability rule, initially to be based on his "compensated dollar" scheme. Fisher's failure to recognize the onset of the Great Depression even as it was happening was directly related to his faith in the quantity theory's seeming implication that price level stability in and of itself guaranteed the continuation of prosperity, while his subsequent work on the debt deflation theory of great depressions initially failed to repair the damage that this failure did to his reputation, and to that of the quantity theory. In the 1930s Fisher nevertheless remained an active supporter of various schemes to reflate and then stabilize the price level. His subsequent influence on the quantity theory based Monetarist counter-revolution that began in the 1950s lay, directly, in its deployment of his analysis of expected inflation on nominal interest rates, and, indirectly, in its espousal of the case for subjecting monetary policy to a legislated rule.
"Currency is to the science of economy what the squaring of the circle is to geometry, or perpetual motion to mechanics" W. S. Jevons (1875)
Economic theories have lives of their own, just like economists, and one way of thinking about our subject's history is as a series of interactions between particular ideas and particular economists. The 1911 publication of The Purchasing Power of Money, whose centenary this conference celebrates, was a high-point in one such significant encounter, that between Irving Fisher, a great economic scientist with an extraordinary gift for simplifying complicated ideas, but also an enthusiastic -even obsessive -social and economic reformer, and the Quantity Theory of Money, an apparently straightforward explanation of the determination of price level, but often deployed over the years in political debates about economic and social affairs. Fisher and the quantity theory were well matched to one another, as we shall see.
The Protagonists
Fisher evidently knew himself well. In a 1924 letter to his wife, reprinted by William Barber et al (eds.) (1997, Vol. 13, pp. 1-2)), he remarked that "Perhaps I'm a Don Quixote but I'm trying to be a Paul Revere", and then proceeded to speculate about his place in a pecking order that descended from "Christ, Socrates and Buddha" to "the social workers at Lowell House and the salvation army". Given that Fisher's causes included world peace, eugenics, healthy living, and prohibition, such speculation was perhaps to be expected from him, but this letter concerned the progress being made by another of his projects, stable money. In this enterprise, he thought, he had "found a niche in making application of my scientific training", which might enable him "to leave behind something more than a book on Index Numbers". This cause proved more durable than some of the others he took up, and Fisher's work on its behalf contributed to a significant episode in the quantity theory of money's long career, as this essay will argue.
Refined though it had become by the time Fisher took up with it, the modern quantity theory's roots in writings going back to sixteenth century Spain (see Marjorie Grice-Hutchinson, 1978) remained clearly visible at the time of their relationship, as they would when it later met up with the monetarists, when Christopher Dow, no friend of the doctrine, would liken it to "a cat with nine times ninety lives, however many times discredited, never to die" (Dow, 1964, p. 308 ). Dow's simile is equally apt when applied to the quantity theory's history immediately before, during, and after its earlier encounter with Fisher, who described his own version of it as follows: "The price level, then, is the result of . . . five great causes . . ., normally varying directly with the quantity of money (and with deposits which normally vary in unison with the quantity of money), provided that the velocities of circulation and the volume of trade remain unchanged, and that there be a given state of development of deposit banking. This is one of the chief propositions concerning the level of prices or its reciprocal, the purchasing power of money. It constitutes the so-called quantity theory of money. The qualifying adverb "normally" is inserted in the formulation in order to provide for the transitional periods or credit cycles" (1911, p. 320 [p.364]) 1
The Quantity Theory's Life before Fisher -Some Highlights
The quantity theory spent the first part of the 19 th century as a component of Classical economics. Here it was routinely assigned the task of explaining the behaviour of the price level under inconvertible paper money, but though Classical economics usually attributed variations in the long run equilibrium value of the price level when money was convertible into gold, silver or both simultaneously -as was usually the case during this period -to fluctuations in their cost of production, it also deployed the quantity theory for short-run analysis under these circumstances as well. 2 The quantity theory's policy influence reached its high-point during the Classical period with the passage of the 1844
Bank Charter Act by the British Parliament. This measure, promoted and designed by the Currency School, sought to eliminate financial crises by giving the Bank of England a monopoly over the issue of paper currency in England and requiring it to hold 100% 1 Here, and elsewhere wherever relevant, the second page reference enclosed in square brackets, is to the reprinted version of the work in the relevant bolume of Barber et al. (eds.) (1997) 2 David Hume's (1752) version of the doctrine is an earlier case in point here in the Classical literature, with variations in the quantity in circulation of gold and/or silver money, or money backed by these metals, being invoked as prime drivers of the price level specie reserves (on the margin) against its note issue. 3 This arrangement was supposed to make the quantity of notes in circulation immediately responsive to the balance of payments, and hence stabilize the price level to an extent sufficient to eliminate financial crises initiated by inflows followed by sudden outflows of the precious metals.
As is well known, though this Act remained in place until 1914, it failed abjectly to achieve its stabilization goal from the very start, in large measure because the version of the quantity theory that underpinned it, unlike Fisher's of 1911, relied on the notion that the money stock that influenced the price level was made up of notes and coin alone, what we would now call currency. Hence it made no allowances for the growing importance of deposit banking in general, and of deposits transferable by cheque in particular, developments that themselves received a considerable boost from the Act's elimination of the English banks' private note issue. In the wake of this conspicuous failure on the part of the quantity theory, Banking School ideas, which attributed a largely passive role to the quantity of money in the financial system and relied on the Classical cost of production theory of value to explain the price level and gold convertibility to regulate its behaviour, came to dominate policy thinking for a while.
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But the quantity theory's mid-19 th century demise was neither complete nor longlasting. Even during the 1850s and '60s, shocks to the world's gold supply originating in California and Australia began to undermine the presumption, underlying much Classical thinking, that stability of the price of money in terms of gold also guaranteed stability of the price of goods in terms of money. Furthermore, the slow deflation that began in the 1870s, following the re-adoption of the gold standard by the United States after the Civil War, and its adoption by the newly founded German empire after its own foundation, as well as the consequent abandonment of bimetallism in France and elsewhere, would drive this lesson further home. In addition to these very practical considerations, which had been rendered all too visible by the rapid development of usable index numbers, the emergence within economic theory of ideas about marginal utility made cost of production increasingly untenable as an explanation of the value of anything, including the precious metals, and therefore of the purchasing power of convertible money. In due course, then, and modified both in the light of its earlier failure and of the particular purposes to which it was now to be put, the quantity theory of money was revived to fill a developing intellectual vacuum that stretched from the foundations of the theory of the price level to the practicalities of monetary policy.
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Fisher and the Quantity Theory Meet
Fisher's long association with the quantity theory began at precisely this juncture in its already long life, specifically in the context of the American debate about bimetallism which would reach its climax in the presidential election of 1896. 6 The basic economic content of this politically complicated and often highly charged affair was straightforward. The quantity theory explained the slow deflation of the era as a consequence of the failure of the world's supply of gold to keep pace with its rapidly growing monetary uses; and to the extent that it seemed to require a policy response, the quantity theory was also available to provide one, namely an increase in the rate of money growth. The bimetallists' specific proposal was to introduce (or re-introduce)
silver alongside gold at a fixed relative price into a monetary system from which, in the case of the United States, it had been excluded by the Specie Resumption Act of 1873, a measure which would quickly be labeled a "crime" by its opponents. Obviously, all three of these studies had close links to the quantity theory, but
Fisher did not initially go out of his way to draw attention to them. It was only in the Purchasing Power of Money that he argued explicitly that the equation of exchange into which the quantity theory injected empirical substance was also the extra equation that the general equilibrium system needed to get from relative to money prices, that the "Fisher effect" as it came to be called, was involved in the mechanisms whereby the price level would move from one quantity theory determined equilibrium value to another, and that his account of the "mechanics of bimetallism" amounted to a specific application of the quantity theory to a particular set of monetary arrangements. 9 Perhaps this was because, in the 1890s, Fisher was not yet fully aware of how integral to his work the quantity theory was already becoming, or perhaps it was because he was nervous about 8 I single out Marshall here among these forerunners of Fisher because the "real -nominal" usage, adopted by Fisher and which we still use, was his. The Marshallian source that Fisher actually cited was the third (1895) edition of his Principles of Economics. It is not clear that he was aware of the 1887 paper at this time. He does, however cite it in (1914, p. 819 [p.576] ). One of the many attractive features of Fisher's intellectual style was has fastidiousness in acknowledging the contributions made by others, a rather rare quality among his contemporaries. 9 The 1894 paper forms the basis of Chapter 7, Section 2, of the Purchasing Power of Money becoming publically associated with the dubious inflationist company it then was keeping. Either way, however, it is clear that his lengthy intellectual encounter with the theory in question had already begun at this time.
The Purchasing Power of Money
There is an element of the reformer's exaggeration to Fisher's claim, made in the preface to the Purchasing Power of Money, that its role in the bimetallic debate had so damaged its reputation that, "especially in America, the quantity theory needs to be re-introduced into general knowledge". (1911, p. viii [p.21] (1898), and would soon perform similar services for Ralph Hawtrey (1913) and Arthur C. Pigou (1912 Pigou ( , 1917 ; nor would it be hard to extend these lists. And there was nothing particularly novel In American discourse, then, the quantity theory was still on the defensive, and Cambridge practice of the time of treating deposit banking as a factor affecting the velocity of currency and discussing its influence on prices in the usually verbal embellishments surrounding their algebra. Formally speaking, this difference is cosmetic, but before long monetary economists such as Lauchlin Currie (e.g.1934) and James Angell (e.g. 1936) , both of whom adopted income velocity versions of the quantity theory, would also go a step beyond Fisher in another dimension, constructing monetary aggregates by summing currency and deposits, thus extending his approach to empirical work on the quantity theory along lines that have been followed ever since. (1926) . As with his exposition of the quantity theory itself, the 13 These measurement difficulties are quite apparent in Fisher's own (1911) often criticized efforts to give empirical content to his version of the quantity theory, as discussed by Laidler 1991, pp79-82, and in, for example, Carl Snyder's (e.g. 1924) slightly later work.. 14 Friedman and Schwartz's (1970) There is no need here to go into the relatively minor differences of detail among
Fisher's specific version of these mechanisms and those of its other exponents 16 . What matters in the current context is his unique perspective on their relationship to the quantity theory of money. Others thought of them as constituting a monetary explanation of the credit or trade cycle, for whose analysis, as Hawtrey (1919, p. v) ) would put it, "the quantity theory by itself is inadequate" because it was an equilibrium relationship applicable only when "the quantity of credit [i.e. deposits] and money [i.e. currency] in circulation is neither increasing nor decreasing" (p. 46)". For Fisher, on the other hand, they were the result of putting the quantity theory to work beyond its "normal" bounds on "transitional periods or credit cycles" (italics added to emphasize that "and" is not
Fisher's chosen conjunction), and this broadening required the recursive nature of the relationship between prices and bank money when the system was out of static equilibrium to be treated as integral to that theory. Dimand (2000) suggests that by confining his analysis of fluctuations to "transition periods" Fisher was also distancing his view of the quantity theory from the claims about long-run non-neutrality of money that had become associated with it during the bimetallic controversy should be read as attempts to accommodate the fluctuations in these that so occupied
Mitchell, an extension of Fisher's analysis made all the more necessary by the fact that the extremely sharp contraction of the U.S. economy in 1920-21 had put these firmly onto the political agenda, The seriousness with which unemployment in particular was now taken is quite evident from the tone of Secretary of Commerce Herbert Hoover's "Foreword" to Mitchell et. al's (1923) (1926) paper . See below for further discussion of these issues. 20 Before the development of aggregate output data, the behaviour of the unemployment rate over time was a commonly used indicator of cyclical fluctuations. See Pigou's (1926, 2 nd ed 1929) Industrial Fluctuations for an example of the systematic application of this practice, and note that Chart 106, p. 214 in this book, apart from using UK data, plotting unemployment rather than employment as does Fisher, and dispensing with distributed lags, is essentially the same as Fisher's (1926) . In discussing his results, Pigou notes that they "agree in a striking way with certain conclusions which Professor Irving Fisher has recently published for the United States" (p. 216) citing Fisher (1923 and 1925) used to link price level movements to employment variations was startlingly oldfashioned for its time. . . . when prices are rising, the rise in the price of the final commodity is generally more rapid than that in the price of the raw material, always more rapid than in the price of labour; and when prices are falling, the fall in the price of the finished commodity is generally more rapid than that in the price of the raw material, always more rapid than that in the price of labour" (pp. 155-156).
And recall also that the stickiness of interest rates, the main factor that distinguishes these two passages, had also first been broached by Marshall in (1887).
The originality or otherwise of Fisher's specific views on the determination of unemployment is not the main point here, however, because they were secondary to his principal purpose, which was provide empirical support to his theoretical interpretation of cyclical fluctuations as mere by-products of the quantity theory's out-of-equilibrium dynamics. Crucially, moreover, this theoretical viewpoint and the evidence adduced in its support implied, in Fisher's view, that price stability was the sine qua non of the economy's smooth and efficient functioning. His reforming zeal for "Stable Money", which received its fullest expression in his 1920 book Stabilizing the Dollar, was thus completely grounded in his own particular scientific understanding of the quantity theory of money's scope and significance.
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Stable Money in the 1920s
The monetary instability associated with World War 1 and its immediate aftermath, in Europe even more than in the United States, made "Stable Money" an attractive cause in the early 1920s. Even so, advocacy of its explicit pursuit did not begin with Fisher, nor was he by any means the first to deploy the quantity theory in this enterprise. His own later History of the Movement (Fisher with Hans Cohrssen, 1934) Fisher was the intellectual driving force behind this episode in the movement's history nevertheless, particularly in its early years, and it seems to be to him that we owe the idea of legally mandating the central bank to pursue a stable price level as its sole policy goal. His book Stabilizing the Dollar (1920) proposed nothing less than that Congress should pass "an Act to the Stabilize the Dollar", and included a "tentative draft" of such an act as the concluding Section 10 (pp. 205-213 [pp.263-271] ), of a lengthy devoted to expounding the "Technical Details" of 21 It should be noted explicitly, nevertheless, that the price index that Fisher used in his empirical work in the 1920s was a wholesale commodity price index that bore little relationship to the transactions price level that the strict application of his version of the quantity theory would have required. Fisher was never one to let awkward questions about data get in the way of empirical results that seemed to support his policy positions.
his proposals for monetary reform. The book thus made a case for subjecting monetary policy to legislated rules that not only set its goal -price-level stability -and specified how this was to be measured, but also laid out the means whereby it was to be achieved.
Curiously though, if only at first sight, and as earlier commentators such as Joseph Reeve (1943) and Don Patinkin (1993) have already pointed out, those means sought not to harness directly the "five great causes" that Fisher's study of the quantity theory had convinced him determined the price level's behaviour, but rather to sidestep them. Fisher did not propose to control the behaviour of the money supply (or M and M' in his terminology) directly so as to offset the effects of variations in the volume of transactions and the velocity of circulation on the price level, but rather to adopt a variation on the gold standard which he had already canvassed earlier under the label "the compensated dollar", in order to effect such control indirectly.
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Specifically this scheme required first the selection and regular computation of a suitable price index, and then the replacement of the legal requirement that the dollar be convertible on demand into a fixed amount of gold by one under which this amount would vary with the gold price of goods, as measured by the index in question, so as to render the dollar convertible at one remove into a fixed bundle of those goods.
Obviously many detailed questions needed to be settled to make such a proposal operational, and the above-mentioned appendix to Stabilizing the Dollar, along with Fisher's work on index numbers -(1911) Ch. 10, but particularly The Making of Index Numbers (1922) mentioned in the 1924 letter to his wife quoted earlier -were intended to do just this. There is no need here to pass judgment on the adequacy of these efforts.
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Suffice it to say that they were convincing enough to some of his contemporaries for his 1920 "Tentative Draft Act" to form the basis of the 1922 Goldsborough Bill for "Stabilizing the Purchasing Power of Money", which, though it failed at the Committee stage in the House of Representatives, was the subject of hearings in which Fisher himself, among others participated. 22 The scheme was briefly discussed, though not under this label in Section 5, of the final chapter of the first (1911) edition of Purchasing Power of Money. The second (1913) edition of the book contains as an "Appendix . . .on 'Standardizing the Dollar'" -" an "extract from an address is Boston before the American Economic Association, December 1912, printed in the American Economic Review Supplement, March 1913 " (pp.494-502 [pp.538-546] ) in which the phrase occurs on p. 495 [p539] . 23 As Boianovsky (2011) argues, Wicksell, an early admirer of the compensated dollar scheme began to lose faith in it under the influence of David Davidson's criticisms, published in Swedish in (1913) .
That the compensated dollar was a variation on the already existing and therefore familiar gold standard and could also form the basis of a stable international monetary order if other nations also adopted it, seemed to Fisher to be advantages when it came to convincing others of its feasibility and desirability. And, as Fisher well aware by (1914), various indexation schemes had also been in circulation for decades, for example those of
Jevons (1875) Marshall (1887) lay hands upon the economic holy-of-holies, and before they can be acted upon they will require an amount of critical discussion commensurate with that which should be given, say, to a proposal fundamentally to alter the marriage relation" (Mitchell et al (1923) p. 270) .
It is safe to say that Adams, his intellectual background as a Wisconsin institutionalist of roughly the same vintage as Commons and Young notwithstanding, did not understand the compensated dollar, and indeed, it is not quite clear that Congressman
Goldsborough himself did either, for Adams quotes him as describing his Bill's purpose as being "to stabilize prices 'by controlling the quantity of money and credits in relation to the volume of trade by increasing or diminishing that quantity as the average price level goes down or up'" (Mitchell et al. (1923) p. 270), a summary of its intentions much more directly related to conventional quantity theory reasoning than to the compensated dollar.
Whatever the truth of this particular matter may be, however, it is certain that while attempts to legislate a price-level stability mandate for Federal Reserve system persisted throughout the 1920s, Fisher's compensated dollar scheme itself soon moved into the background. 24 It gave way to variations on ideas about "credit control", similar to those evident in Goldsborough's remark, and more in the spirit of Ralph Hawtrey 's (1919) (1898), whose analysis provided the basis for Gustav Cassel's (1928) discussion of these matters, which was, as Thomas Humphrey (2002) Even so, it was not the complexity of Fisher's own specific ideas on monetary reform that would, at the end of the decade, finally and completely undermine his standing and that of the quantity theory as well. Rather, it was his very public misreading of the 24 Boianovsky's (2011) suggestion that Fisher himself began to lose confidence in this scheme as the decade progressed is surely plausible, in the light of the account he gives of the criticism to which it was subjected.. 25 It should nevertheless be noted than among those who did understand the proposal was Keynes, who in (1923, pp. 147-48) singled out for approval what it revealed about both Fisher's understanding that domestic price stability and exchange rate stability were sometimes in competition, and his willingness to give priority to the former. It should also be noted that Mitchell himself would take much more notice of Fisher in his (1927) Business Cycles with no fewer than 22 indexed references to his work. Dimand (2000) discusses Mitchell's 1927 response to Fisher in some detail, but also notes that the amount of attention given to Fisher here was an anomaly in Mitchell's work. 26 For a more detailed account of Fisher's own views on this matter, and how they changed over time, see Appendix 1 pp. 374-398 to Stable Money. . . (1934) significance of the stock market crash of October 1929, and of the seriousness of the subsequent real downturn of 1930-32.
The Crash and the Depression
That Fisher misdiagnosed the behaviour of the stock market in the autumn of 1929 as nothing more than a bout of temporary instability is well known and requires little elaboration here. On October 30 th -six days after the market broke -he told a meeting of the District of Columbia Bankers' Association that " . . . we are in a state of rapid transition, with great prosperity at present and greater prosperity in view in the future" and suggested that "these . . . rather than speculation, or these plus speculation, explain the high stock markets, and when it is finally rid of the lunatic fringe, the stock market will still never go back to 50 percent of its present level, what it was in 1926" (Fisher 1929, p.23 [p.25] In this same speech, Fisher attributed the past and future prosperity of the American economy on which his reading of the stock market rested to the systematic application of science to generating technical progress, the spread of scientific management and its growing acceptance by the labour force, whose own productivity was also being enhanced by the beneficial effects of prohibition, and finally to "an immense impulse to prosperity through a stable price level, a more stable price level . . . than we ever had in half a dozen years in our lifetime, or in recorded history" ( p. 10 In 1932 Fisher found ex post rationalizations for this awkward fact of course, but crucial to the topic of this paper, in 1929 it had deceived an observer who, since 1911 had repeatedly touted successful price level stabilization as sufficient in itself to guarantee the continuation of overall prosperity. The quantity theory as he had come to understand it thus let Fisher down badly in late 1929, and the fact that he had relied so heavily on it in formulating his public position could not have done much for the quantity theory's reputation either. Nor in 1929 did Fisher simply take a public position. As the saying has it, his money -about $11 million of it -was also where his mouth was, and his continued faith in this implication of the quantity theory led to his financial ruin even as it also undermined the scientific reputation upon which his authority as a policy commentator rested.
Fisher's monograph Booms and Depressions (1932) was meant to repair that reputation, but it attracted little attention, perhaps just as well, given that it ended with a post-script dated September 1932 (p. 157-158 [p. 217-218] ) proclaiming that "recovery seems to be in sight" (p. 157 [ p. 217]); but he was nevertheless sufficiently anxious to establish the importance and originality of the "Debt Deflation Theory of Great
Depressions" expounded in this book that he took the opportunity presented by an invitation to contribute to the first issue of Econometrica to publish a stand-alone summary of it (Fisher 1933) . The theory in question followed his earlier work in focusing on price level instability as the source of all other instability, but the downward spiral into depression that it described -running from debt-driven sales of goods through falling prices to rising real indebtedness and thence to further sales and price falls -went well beyond anything that could be characterized as an extension of the quantity theory. It was nevertheless an original creation and particularly in its stand-alone exposition, has by now long been recognized as such.
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Even so, in 1933 there was no novelty in the policy implications that Fisher's theory yielded: namely, that deflation had been destructive, reflation was urgently 28 In particular it seems to have provided much of the early inspiration for Hyman Minsky's long neglected prophesies about the inherent instability of financial markets. See for example, Minsky (1963) . Even so, Axel Leijonhufvud has told me, in personal correspondence, that in the early 1960s he was allowed to work on a doctoral dissertation at Northwester in which he began to develop his own version of the debtdeflation theory for 18 months before anyone -David Meiselman then at the University of Chicago as it happens -alerted him to the existence of Fisher's earlier work. The Chicago connection here rings true, because Minsky impressed upon the present writer at just this time -he was my senior colleague at Berkeley between 1963 and 1965 -, that Henry Simons had first inspired his own interest in such topics while he was an undergraduate student there.
required, and once accomplished should be followed up by renewed efforts to put stable money into place. This basic message, and particularly its first two components, still had influential detractors in the United States to be sure -see for example, James. L.
Laughlin ( localities during the depths of the depression, and owing its intellectual origins to the work of the unorthodox German economist Silvio Gesell, who would also attract a rather more than passing mention from Keynes (1936, pp. 353-358); in (1934) , he welcomed President Roosevelt's earlier revaluation of gold, a measure that certainly owed more than a little to the compensated dollar idea, but was undertaken not on his advice, but mainly on that of the agricultural economist George F. Warren, and Fisher's own former student James Harvey Rogers; and he also found time to praise the by now well known (thanks to Lars Jonung 1979) More versions of it than Fisher's were in American circulation by then, however.
In particular, as noted earlier, Ralph Hawtrey's (1913 Hawtrey's ( , 1919 monetary theory of the cycle had started from its Cambridge version and in the later 1920s had exerted considerable influence on American discussions of "credit control" as a means of stabilizing the price level at the very time that Fisher's influence in the stable money campaign was beginning to wane. Hawtrey had also already canvassed "fiscal inflationism" as a means of coping with depression even in the 1920s -see e.g. Hawtrey (1925) -and the appearance of such finds space for less than a single page (Vol. 6, ) from this 452 page monograph. Note that Chicago economists were not the only originators of 100 per cent money proposals. Laughlin Currie (1934) independently developed. his own version of the scheme, as his former undergraduate student Hart (1935) Crucial in the current context, moreover, the natural rate hypothesis immensely strengthened the essentially Fisherian case that Friedman (e.g. 1958) had long been making that monetary policy could be directed only at controlling the price level, and should be legally constrained to this task. To be sure his money growth rule was not a price level rule, but his choice here rested on technical judgments about how best to achieve stable behaviour in the latter, not on any deep theoretical reasons. "Stable
Money" in Fisher's sense was also Friedman's aim, even if the immediate influence on him was Henry Simons. It is thus hard to resist the conclusion that the quantity theory's involvement with Monetarism's version of stable money was a direct legacy of its earlier encounter with Fisher.
Concluding Comment: The Quantity Theory in Limbo
At the time of writing, the quantity theory is yet again in limbo. Its most recent demise had two causes, one a variation on an old weakness, and the other new. First, money growth targeting, a practical, but diluted, application Friedman's policy proposals, did not work well, in some measure because it provoked institutional adaptations that should not have, but evidently did, come as a surprise to anyone aware of what the consequences of the 1844 Bank Charter had been for the quantity theory's reputation in an earlier era.
Second, the New-classical money-supply surprise model of the cycle -a still 36 As noted earlier, Fisher knew that the distinction between real and nominal interest rates appeared in Marshall's work, as indeed did the vocabulary itself. Even so, the much greater clarity with which Fisher (1896) brought to bear on the role of expectations as opposed to realizations of inflation in this context entitles him to the credit that Friedman gives him here. 37 Wicksell was not, of course, quite as innocent of this distinction as Friedman suggested -See Laidler (1991, pp. 134-5) and especially Boianovsky (2011) quantity-theory based successor to Friedman and Schwartz's monetarist approachreformulated Friedman's expectations-augmented Phillips curve as an aggregate supply curve and hence reverted to Fisher's (1911 Fisher's ( , 1923 Fisher's ( , 1925 Fisher's ( and 1926 practice of giving temporal primacy to price level behaviour in the transmission mechanism of monetary impulses. 38 It thus set itself up for gross empirical failure when faced with the basic facts of the timing of the real and nominal responses to changes in money growth that
Friedman and Schwartz, among others, had so thoroughly documented.
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Given these two failures, it is not surprising that most macroeconomists would soon discard the quantity theory and succumb to the domination of real business cycle theory and New-Keynesian economics, neither of which leaves any significant space for money to play a role in the economy. The goal of stable money, in the guise of inflation targets, nevertheless survived the quantity theory's disappearance for a while, only to be threatened by another more recent repetition of history, namely the apparent failure before 2008, as before 1929, of the price level to give a clear warning about the approach of a major economic crisis. Whether this last development means that the quantity theory is finally dead, or only that it has gone into hiding prior to beginning yet another of its nine times ninety lives, remains to be seen. Historians of economics will be inclined to bet on the latter possibility, and therefore continue to take an interest in this doctrine's earlier incarnations, not least the one which Irving Fisher did so much to shape. 38 As noted above (fn. 16), Friedman himself accepted this reformulation in (1975) . Whether this was a wise step is a matter too complex for discussion here, so let me simply assert that I do not think it was. 39 But see, nevertheless, fn.34, above.
